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Background
q Risk is inherent in all space missions. Effective identification & management
of risk are critical responsibilities of project management & often determine
whether a mission will be successful
q Risk Management is the focused unrelenting effort to confront uncertainty and
bring it into adjustment with technical, safety, cost, and schedule
q Risk is also the probability that an unfavorable result will occur & severity of
its consequences. It can take various forms:
â Technical
â Programmatic or Political
Mission Operations
â Schedule
â Cost
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Agenda
â Issues associated with Mission Operations
âDealing with the unknown
Searching for root causes
âDeveloping recovery options
âMOA for Mission Success
Risk Associated with Mission Ops
q Program. maintenance & operation must recognize that Mission Operations is
not just "operations" in the usual meaning
q Most satellites reach "operational" status after on-orbit verification tests,
significant reduction in the workforce to meet Zero Base Review
requirements
Cl Safety & Mission Assurance function reduces the risk of human single point
failures
q Ensure common practices and processes are consistently applied throughout
the Agency
q Ensure lessons learned from investigations are captured and shared among the
projects and missions
q Insure adequate time spent to investigate and resolve anomalies
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Why is Mission Ops Assurance important?
CI Improve Operational Reliability of Spacecraft During Mission Operations.
Ensure Program. & Mission Objectives, Spacecraft Design & Capabilities, and
Flight Operations Planning & Implementation are Compatible and Consistent.
q Facilitate Integration of the Mission Assurance Function Into the Project so that
All Team Members Share Responsibility for Program & Mission Success.
L] Assure the Design, Implementation, Integration, Validation & Execution of
Operations Processes are Sufficient to Successfully Accomplish Program &
Mission Objectives.
Q Provide the Project Management Team and Institutional Management Visibility
Into Mission Operations Issues, Concerns and Recommendations, as
Appropriate.
L] Perform Independent Risk Assessments of Operational Activities Particularly
for Upcoming Critical Events
Q Provide :Direct Transfer of Knowledge and Experience to Existing and Future
Flight Projects.
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Manage Risk with Known Issues
CJ Participate in mission ops level risk reviews with a focus on compliance to the
current policy requirements for risk management.
â This may result in the following.
Use of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)- procedure, by which
each potential failure mode of each element of a system is analyzed to
determine the effects of the failure mode on the system and to classify each
potential failure mode of according to the severity of the effects.
Use of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)- a qualitative technique to uncover
credible ways that a top event (undesired) can occur. The results of the
FTA are documented in a fault tree, which is a graphical representation of
the combination of the faults that will result in the occurrence of an
undesired to event.
Cl Maintain list of Mission Ops high priority (top `n' ) risks.
â Risk list is the listing of all identified Mission Ops risk in priority order from
highest to lowest risk, together with the information that is needed to manage
each risk and document its evolution over the course of the project.
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C1 Event occurs
â Document the condition and the activities that lead up to the event
q Brainstorming
A What do we Know?
q Develop and Event or process Causal factor flow diagram
Build an event sequence / causal factor sequence diagram
q Develop fish bone or Develop a Root cause Tree or Map
q Eliminate not-possible causes
9 determine most probable cause
q Develop recovery options
q Build an event sequence diagram for recovery plan
A Identify success criteria for each event
q Validate, Implement and verify plan
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Describe Problem and Prior Conditions
q Finding the root cause by first collecting all appropriate data that lead up to the event
and to date
);o, Each team member document what they know (with out input from others)
What events occurred
• What did they do
• What did they see
• Facts first
• Them assumptions
n Look back to a point in time sound data support normal operations
o May need to go back farther based on event/failure
• Including commands sent
• Files loaded
• Procedures executed
• Environment activities, (ground and space)
• Change in mission profile
• Personal, changes, etc.
What is the Last known state of the system
n All elements not just the failed element
q This will support building event sequence and timeline 	 9
Brainstormingfor Root Cause -Fish Bone
Diagram
C] Fish bone
â Develop fishbone diagram if greater detail is need
â Aids in driving out possible failure factors
• Develops a comprehensive picture of potential causes
• bounds the condition
â Start with Failure condition as the effect
Use .Data, SW, HW, human error, environment as possible errors (bones)
n Ask How this bone could have contributed
â Functional Fault tree, Event driven and functional block diagram will aid in this
process
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Example am
U Condition
A Mission Operations Center (MOC) notification
S/C transitioned into sun/mag-reference pointing mode at
the end of a slew
);o,
 Next bad quaternions generated due to star ID problems
â S/C not achieving and/or holding required attitude
Now lets talk about the tools we used to find this
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Example Fish Bone Diagram
""light & Ground system
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Attitude Control System
Spacecraft Attitude Sensors:
-Sun & Earth Sensors
- Magnetometers
Reaction Wheels	 Estimator	
- Gyros
- GPS
Actuators	 Controller
- Thrusters
- Magnetic torque
- Momentum Control Devices
- Dampers
- Spin Stablization
- Gravity-Gradient Stablization
Disturbance Torques
- Earth's Magnetic Field
- Atmospheric Drag
- Gravity Gradient
- Solar Radiation Pressure
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Software
-Software Patches
-Uploads can be
incompatible with flight
software
-Resets can cause all
the patches to be lost
-Star Catalog Errors (ie: XTE
Mission)
Straviight Error Source
-Reflected light from the satellite (ie:
antenna boom)
-Sun, Earth, or Moon in the field of view
(FOV)
-Thruster plume in the FOV (ie: Star
Trackers on Messenger Mission)
-Errors in the Sunshade Analysis
Radiation
-Single Event Effects (SEE)
(Processor and CCD)
-Non Destructive and
Destructive
-Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
-Proton and Electron Radiation Flux
-Short Term and Long Term
CCD Damage
-Darkening of the Optics
Star Tracker
Thermal	 Power System
-Sun Exposure (Non-uniform	 -Power Surges
heating)	
-Power failures
-Thermoelectric Cooler (TEC)
failure (if applicable)
-Mounting interface exceeds
temperature limits (Operating,
Survival, or Optimal)
-Mounting interface instability
-Alignment shifts due to
temperature gradients
Contamination
-internal Source (Components inside the
tracker outgassing)
-External Source
-Baffle coatings flaking and
landing on the optics
-Atomic Oxygen (if applicable)
-Other components near the Star
Tracker outgassing
-Thruster plumes
-Debris from separation stages
or jettisoned components 	 1	 14
Develop an Event & Process Flow
Diagram
Additional Tools for Moot Cause Analysis if more detail is needed
Ll Build an event sequence with a time lime for normal ops
A Repeat the process with the events that occurred
â The undesired event is the starting point for the next step
Ll Develop a Root causal Free or Map
â Populate a causal factor diagram
â Place undesired event at top of tree
â Ask What are the events, conditions and exceeded/failed controls or barrier that
occurred leading up to the event.
â .Add all events, conditions and exceeded/failed controls or barrier that occurred
leading up to the event. include people, H/W, SAW, policy, procedures
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Build an Event Tree Structure
In Building an event tree
Capture each step/event
Fully operational
^a^ss
	
	
Partly operational
Limited of science
I Initiating Event I
impact to mission
Partly operational
Loss of science
Faii	 Loss of Mission
Identify initiating event l activity
Identify the possible out comes of
each step (End State)
Identify the risks to taking each step
If more than one end states was
identified
decomposes branch until a single
end state is found
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Determining Recovery Options
U Develop recovery options
Insert recovery options in sequence flow diagram
o Aids in determining if options will meet objectives
o Aids in identifying other options
o Aids in determining secondary effects to recovery actions
U Prioritize recovery options
^ Time critical
• Mission, Performance, Science
â Risk to Mission
• What Can go wrong?
• What options can be ground verified before execution?
CI Build an event sequence diagram for planned recovery option(s)
'-o Develop all steps for recovery with pass/fail criteria
â Define Pass/fall criteria
• Pass. — document and move on
• Fail -- reenter failure analysis
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Develop Recovery Options
q Brainstorm recovery options, consider
â Fixing root or proximate cause
Developing work around
q Build sequence flow diagram for each option ~
â Map options agents objectives
• Look for secondary effects
• Technique helps identify additional options
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Prioritize Recovery Options
Ca Time critical
n Mission, Perfonnance, Science
Ll Risk to Mission
â Determine the full and minimum recovery requirements
Decompose the recovery steps
• What steps have to be successful
• What can go wrong in each step
o Identify the risk to the mission for implementing each
step
n What options can be ground verified before execution?
Fish Bone Axis
Cl Possible Cause
â Proton hit corrupting or
creating star centroid
LJ Effect -.failure
â Corrupted valid star used in
star ID
q Data Showed
Corrupted quaternion due to
star ID problems
q Khat to do
Corrupted quaternion
Difference between current
& previous quaternion is not
so great.
â If centroid & catalog stars
are available; then, compute
star measurement residuals &
look for large residuals
â Check for planets in the FOV
or bright objects near the
FOV
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An Answer to the example
LJ During high electron activity due to a geomagnetic
St01'm
LJ S/C bus triggered Safehold and dropped into sun-
reference pointing mode
LI S/C main processor rebooted
LJ S/C lost Knowledge and Attitude
U All instruments were powered off
LI Star tracker failed to reinitialize
LI Asoft-reboot was sent to star tracker
LJ S/C was commanded to inertial pointing mode
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MOA for Mission Success
q An effective risk management process is critical to mission success
U A thorough test & verification program is also essential for mission
success
q Test-as-you-fly, fly-as-you-test
q Institutional management sets policies, procedures for mission success
q Formal hand-off process (including all documentations) from pre-launch to
.mission ops team
q Consult appropriate experts and communication across institutional
interfaces
q Telemetry coverage of critical events for analysis & feedback to other
projects and missions
q Formalize and implement Independent Technical Review Team
